diff --git a/bubblewrap.c b/bubblewrap.c
index 771e1eaf..17aaa8bd 100644
--- a/bubblewrap.c
+++ b/bubblewrap.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static const char *host_tty_dev;
 static int proc_fd = -1;
 static const char *opt_exec_label = NULL;
 static const char *opt_file_label = NULL;
+static const char *opt_apparmor_profile = NULL;
 static bool opt_as_pid_1;
 
 const char *opt_chdir_path = NULL;
@@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ usage (int ecode, FILE *out)
            "    --remount-ro DEST            Remount DEST as readonly; does not recursively remount\n"
            "    --exec-label LABEL           Exec label for the sandbox\n"
            "    --file-label LABEL           File label for temporary sandbox content\n"
+           "    --apparmor-profile PROFILE   AppArmor profile for the sandbox\n"
            "    --proc DEST                  Mount new procfs on DEST\n"
            "    --dev DEST                   Mount new dev on DEST\n"
            "    --tmpfs DEST                 Mount new tmpfs on DEST\n"
@@ -1681,6 +1683,15 @@ parse_args_recurse (int          *argcp,
           if (label_create_file (opt_file_label))
             die_with_error ("--file-label setup failed");
 
+          argv += 1;
+          argc -= 1;
+        }
+      else if (strcmp (arg, "--apparmor-profile") == 0)
+        {
+          if (argc < 2)
+            die ("--apparmor-profile takes an argument");
+          opt_apparmor_profile = argv[1];
+
           argv += 1;
           argc -= 1;
         }
@@ -2245,10 +2256,6 @@ main (int    argc,
   /* Get the (optional) privileges we need */
   acquire_privs ();
 
-  /* Never gain any more privs during exec */
-  if (prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
-    die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) failed");
-
   /* The initial code is run with high permissions
      (i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so take lots of care. */
 
@@ -2836,6 +2843,13 @@ main (int    argc,
   if (label_exec (opt_exec_label) == -1)
     die_with_error ("label_exec %s", argv[0]);
 
+  if (apparmor_change_profile (opt_apparmor_profile) == -1)
+    die_with_error ("apparmor_change_profile %s", opt_apparmor_profile);
+
+  /* Never gain any more privs during exec */
+  if (prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
+    die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) failed");
+
   __debug__ (("forking for child\n"));
 
   if (!opt_as_pid_1 && (opt_unshare_pid || lock_files != NULL || opt_sync_fd != -1))
diff --git a/bwrap.xml b/bwrap.xml
index e0e9c697..b77b6b58 100644
--- a/bwrap.xml
+++ b/bwrap.xml
@@ -283,6 +283,13 @@
 	the SELinux context for the sandbox content.
       </para></listitem>
     </varlistentry>
+    <varlistentry>
+      <term><option>--apparmor-profile <arg choice="plain">PROFILE</arg></option></term>
+      <listitem><para>
+	AppArmor Profile from the sandbox. On an AppArmor system you can specify the
+	profile for the sandbox process(s). Requires writable procfs.
+      </para></listitem>
+    </varlistentry>
     <varlistentry>
       <term><option>--block-fd <arg choice="plain">FD</arg></option></term>
       <listitem><para>
diff --git a/utils.c b/utils.c
index a99a8650..f1da18e3 100644
--- a/utils.c
+++ b/utils.c
@@ -824,3 +824,16 @@ label_exec (const char *exec_label)
 #endif
   return 0;
 }
+
+int apparmor_change_profile (const char *profile)
+{
+  cleanup_free char *data = NULL;
+
+  if (!profile)
+    return 0;
+  data = strconcat ("changeprofile ", profile);
+  if (write_file_at (-1, "/proc/self/attr/apparmor/current", data) == -1)
+    return -1;
+
+  return 0;
+}
diff --git a/utils.h b/utils.h
index 8c4db619..a462cadb 100644
--- a/utils.h
+++ b/utils.h
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ char *label_mount (const char *opt,
                    const char *mount_label);
 int   label_exec (const char *exec_label);
 int   label_create_file (const char *file_label);
+int   apparmor_change_profile (const char *profile);
 
 static inline void
 cleanup_freep (void *p)