diff --git a/examples/servers/typescript/README.md b/examples/servers/typescript/README.md
index 5beacf1..53c28fd 100644
--- a/examples/servers/typescript/README.md
+++ b/examples/servers/typescript/README.md
@@ -170,3 +170,21 @@ If you're implementing MCP in another language/SDK:
 5. **Handle Notifications Carefully**: Catch/ignore errors when no client is connected
 
 **Goal**: All SDK example servers provide the same interface, enabling a single test suite to verify conformance across all implementations.
+
+## Negative Test Cases
+
+### no-dns-rebinding-protection.ts
+
+A minimal MCP server that intentionally omits DNS rebinding protection. This is a **negative test case** that demonstrates what a vulnerable server looks like and is expected to **FAIL** the `dns-rebinding-protection` conformance scenario.
+
+```bash
+# Run the vulnerable server
+npx tsx no-dns-rebinding-protection.ts
+
+# This should FAIL the dns-rebinding-protection checks
+npx @modelcontextprotocol/conformance server \
+  --url http://localhost:3003/mcp \
+  --scenario dns-rebinding-protection
+```
+
+**DO NOT** use this pattern in production servers. Always use `createMcpExpressApp()` or the `localhostHostValidation()` middleware for localhost servers.
diff --git a/examples/servers/typescript/everything-server.ts b/examples/servers/typescript/everything-server.ts
index 9dd382a..374e48c 100644
--- a/examples/servers/typescript/everything-server.ts
+++ b/examples/servers/typescript/everything-server.ts
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import {
   EventId,
   StreamId
 } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js';
+import { createMcpExpressApp } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/express.js';
 import {
   ElicitResultSchema,
   ListToolsRequestSchema,
@@ -26,7 +27,6 @@ import {
 } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';
 import { zodToJsonSchema } from 'zod-to-json-schema';
 import { z } from 'zod';
-import express from 'express';
 import cors from 'cors';
 import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
 
@@ -1055,8 +1055,8 @@ function isInitializeRequest(body: any): boolean {
 
 // ===== EXPRESS APP =====
 
-const app = express();
-app.use(express.json());
+// Use createMcpExpressApp for DNS rebinding protection on localhost
+const app = createMcpExpressApp();
 
 // Configure CORS to expose Mcp-Session-Id header for browser-based clients
 app.use(
diff --git a/examples/servers/typescript/no-dns-rebinding-protection.ts b/examples/servers/typescript/no-dns-rebinding-protection.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1ff754
--- /dev/null
+++ b/examples/servers/typescript/no-dns-rebinding-protection.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+
+/**
+ * MCP Server WITHOUT DNS Rebinding Protection - Negative Test Case
+ *
+ * This is the simplest possible vulnerable server to demonstrate what happens
+ * when DNS rebinding protection is omitted. DO NOT use this pattern in production.
+ *
+ * This server should FAIL the dns-rebinding-protection conformance scenario.
+ */
+
+import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
+import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js';
+import express from 'express';
+
+// Create minimal MCP server
+const server = new McpServer({
+  name: 'no-dns-rebinding-protection-server',
+  version: '1.0.0'
+});
+
+// Add a simple tool
+server.tool(
+  'echo',
+  'Echo the input back',
+  { message: { type: 'string' } },
+  async ({ message }) => ({
+    content: [{ type: 'text', text: `Echo: ${message}` }]
+  })
+);
+
+// === VULNERABLE EXPRESS APP ===
+// This intentionally does NOT use createMcpExpressApp() or localhostHostValidation()
+const app = express();
+app.use(express.json());
+// NO DNS rebinding protection middleware here!
+
+app.post('/mcp', async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    // Stateless: no session ID
+    const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
+      sessionIdGenerator: undefined
+    });
+    await server.connect(transport);
+    await transport.handleRequest(req, res, req.body);
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (!res.headersSent) {
+      res.status(500).json({
+        jsonrpc: '2.0',
+        error: {
+          code: -32603,
+          message: `Internal error: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`
+        },
+        id: null
+      });
+    }
+  }
+});
+
+const PORT = parseInt(process.env.PORT || '3003', 10);
+app.listen(PORT, '127.0.0.1', () => {
+  console.log(`Vulnerable server running on http://localhost:${PORT}/mcp`);
+  console.log(`WARNING: No DNS rebinding protection enabled!`);
+});
diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json
index 645e101..c790e4d 100644
--- a/package-lock.json
+++ b/package-lock.json
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
         "eventsource-parser": "^3.0.6",
         "express": "^5.1.0",
         "jose": "^6.1.2",
+        "undici": "^7.19.0",
         "yaml": "^2.8.2",
         "zod": "^3.25.76"
       },
@@ -4926,6 +4927,15 @@
         "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/antfu"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/undici": {
+      "version": "7.19.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/undici/-/undici-7.19.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-Heho1hJD81YChi+uS2RkSjcVO+EQLmLSyUlHyp7Y/wFbxQaGb4WXVKD073JytrjXJVkSZVzoE2MCSOKugFGtOQ==",
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=20.18.1"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/undici-types": {
       "version": "6.21.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/undici-types/-/undici-types-6.21.0.tgz",
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 39532db..861a257 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
     "eventsource-parser": "^3.0.6",
     "express": "^5.1.0",
     "jose": "^6.1.2",
+    "undici": "^7.19.0",
     "yaml": "^2.8.2",
     "zod": "^3.25.76"
   }
diff --git a/src/scenarios/index.ts b/src/scenarios/index.ts
index 470ffed..6dc8070 100644
--- a/src/scenarios/index.ts
+++ b/src/scenarios/index.ts
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ import {
   PromptsGetWithImageScenario
 } from './server/prompts';
 
+import { DNSRebindingProtectionScenario } from './server/dns-rebinding';
+
 import { authScenariosList } from './client/auth/index';
 import { listMetadataScenarios } from './client/auth/discovery-metadata';
 
@@ -123,7 +125,10 @@ const allClientScenariosList: ClientScenario[] = [
   new PromptsGetSimpleScenario(),
   new PromptsGetWithArgsScenario(),
   new PromptsGetEmbeddedResourceScenario(),
-  new PromptsGetWithImageScenario()
+  new PromptsGetWithImageScenario(),
+
+  // Security scenarios
+  new DNSRebindingProtectionScenario()
 ];
 
 // Active client scenarios (excludes pending)
diff --git a/src/scenarios/server/dns-rebinding.ts b/src/scenarios/server/dns-rebinding.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f21f8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/scenarios/server/dns-rebinding.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/**
+ * DNS Rebinding Protection test scenarios for MCP servers
+ *
+ * Tests that localhost MCP servers properly validate Host or Origin headers
+ * to prevent DNS rebinding attacks. See GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w for details.
+ */
+
+import { ClientScenario, ConformanceCheck } from '../../types';
+import { request } from 'undici';
+
+const SPEC_REFERENCES = [
+  {
+    id: 'MCP-DNS-Rebinding-Protection',
+    url: 'https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/security_best_practices#local-mcp-server-compromise'
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'MCP-Transport-Security',
+    url: 'https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#security-warning'
+  }
+];
+
+/**
+ * Check if URL is a localhost URL
+ */
+function isLocalhostUrl(serverUrl: string): boolean {
+  const url = new URL(serverUrl);
+  const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();
+  return (
+    hostname === 'localhost' ||
+    hostname === '127.0.0.1' ||
+    hostname === '[::1]' ||
+    hostname === '::1'
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the host header value from a URL (hostname:port)
+ */
+function getHostFromUrl(serverUrl: string): string {
+  const url = new URL(serverUrl);
+  return url.host; // includes port if present
+}
+
+/**
+ * Send an MCP initialize request with custom Host and Origin headers.
+ * Both headers are set to the same value so that servers checking either
+ * Host or Origin will properly detect the rebinding attempt.
+ */
+async function sendRequestWithHostAndOrigin(
+  serverUrl: string,
+  hostOrOrigin: string
+): Promise<{ statusCode: number; body: unknown }> {
+  const response = await request(serverUrl, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: {
+      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+      Host: hostOrOrigin,
+      Origin: `http://${hostOrOrigin}`,
+      Accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream'
+    },
+    body: JSON.stringify({
+      jsonrpc: '2.0',
+      id: 1,
+      method: 'initialize',
+      params: {
+        protocolVersion: '2025-11-25',
+        capabilities: {},
+        clientInfo: { name: 'conformance-dns-rebinding-test', version: '1.0.0' }
+      }
+    })
+  });
+
+  let body: unknown;
+  try {
+    body = await response.body.json();
+  } catch {
+    body = null;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    statusCode: response.statusCode,
+    body
+  };
+}
+
+export class DNSRebindingProtectionScenario implements ClientScenario {
+  name = 'dns-rebinding-protection';
+  description = `Test DNS rebinding protection for localhost servers.
+
+**Scope:** This test applies to localhost MCP servers running without HTTPS and without
+authentication. These servers are vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks where a malicious
+website tricks a user's browser into making requests to the local server.
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. User visits malicious website (e.g., evil.com)
+2. evil.com's DNS is configured to resolve to 127.0.0.1
+3. Browser makes request to evil.com which actually goes to localhost
+4. Without Host/Origin header validation, the local MCP server processes the request
+
+**Requirements:**
+- Server **MUST** validate the Host or Origin header on incoming requests
+- Server **MUST** reject requests with non-localhost Host/Origin headers (HTTP 4xx)
+- Server **MUST** accept requests with valid localhost Host/Origin headers
+
+**Valid localhost values:** \`localhost\`, \`127.0.0.1\`, \`[::1]\` (with optional port)
+
+**Note:** This test requires a localhost server URL. Non-localhost URLs will fail.
+
+See: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w`;
+
+  async run(serverUrl: string): Promise<ConformanceCheck[]> {
+    const checks: ConformanceCheck[] = [];
+    const timestamp = new Date().toISOString();
+
+    // Common check properties
+    const rejectedCheckBase = {
+      id: 'localhost-host-rebinding-rejected',
+      name: 'DNSRebindingRejected',
+      description:
+        'Server rejects requests with non-localhost Host/Origin headers',
+      timestamp,
+      specReferences: SPEC_REFERENCES
+    };
+
+    const acceptedCheckBase = {
+      id: 'localhost-host-valid-accepted',
+      name: 'LocalhostHostAccepted',
+      description:
+        'Server accepts requests with valid localhost Host/Origin headers',
+      timestamp,
+      specReferences: SPEC_REFERENCES
+    };
+
+    // First check: Is this a localhost URL?
+    if (!isLocalhostUrl(serverUrl)) {
+      const errorMessage =
+        'DNS rebinding tests require a localhost server URL (localhost, 127.0.0.1, or [::1])';
+      const details = { serverUrl, reason: 'non-localhost-url' };
+
+      checks.push({
+        ...rejectedCheckBase,
+        status: 'FAILURE',
+        errorMessage,
+        details
+      });
+      checks.push({
+        ...acceptedCheckBase,
+        status: 'FAILURE',
+        errorMessage,
+        details
+      });
+      return checks;
+    }
+
+    const validHost = getHostFromUrl(serverUrl);
+    const attackerHost = 'evil.example.com';
+
+    // Check 1: Invalid Host/Origin headers should be rejected with a 4xx error
+    try {
+      const response = await sendRequestWithHostAndOrigin(
+        serverUrl,
+        attackerHost
+      );
+      const isRejected =
+        response.statusCode >= 400 && response.statusCode < 500;
+
+      const details = {
+        hostHeader: attackerHost,
+        originHeader: `http://${attackerHost}`,
+        statusCode: response.statusCode,
+        body: response.body
+      };
+
+      if (isRejected) {
+        checks.push({
+          ...rejectedCheckBase,
+          status: 'SUCCESS',
+          details
+        });
+      } else {
+        checks.push({
+          ...rejectedCheckBase,
+          status: 'FAILURE',
+          errorMessage: `Expected HTTP 4xx for invalid Host/Origin headers, got ${response.statusCode}`,
+          details
+        });
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      checks.push({
+        ...rejectedCheckBase,
+        status: 'FAILURE',
+        errorMessage: `Request failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
+        details: {
+          hostHeader: attackerHost,
+          originHeader: `http://${attackerHost}`
+        }
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Check 2: Valid localhost Host/Origin headers should be accepted (2xx response)
+    try {
+      const response = await sendRequestWithHostAndOrigin(serverUrl, validHost);
+      const isAccepted =
+        response.statusCode >= 200 && response.statusCode < 300;
+
+      const details = {
+        hostHeader: validHost,
+        originHeader: `http://${validHost}`,
+        statusCode: response.statusCode,
+        body: response.body
+      };
+
+      if (isAccepted) {
+        checks.push({
+          ...acceptedCheckBase,
+          status: 'SUCCESS',
+          details
+        });
+      } else {
+        checks.push({
+          ...acceptedCheckBase,
+          status: 'FAILURE',
+          errorMessage: `Expected HTTP 2xx for valid localhost Host/Origin headers, got ${response.statusCode}`,
+          details
+        });
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      checks.push({
+        ...acceptedCheckBase,
+        status: 'FAILURE',
+        errorMessage: `Request failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,
+        details: { hostHeader: validHost, originHeader: `http://${validHost}` }
+      });
+    }
+
+    return checks;
+  }
+}