fix(deps): update dependency jspdf to v4.1.0 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
jspdf	4.0.0 → 4.1.0

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GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-24040

Impact

The addJS method in the jspdf Node.js build utilizes a shared module-scoped variable (text) to store JavaScript content. When used in a concurrent environment (e.g., a Node.js web server), this variable is shared across all requests.

If multiple requests generate PDFs simultaneously, the JavaScript content intended for one user may be overwritten by a subsequent request before the document is generated. This results in Cross-User Data Leakage, where the PDF generated for User A contains the JavaScript payload (and any embedded sensitive data) intended for User B.

Typically, this only affects server-side environments, although the same race conditions might occur if jsPDF runs client-side.

import { jsPDF } from "jspdf";

const docA = new jsPDF();
const docB = new jsPDF();

// 1. User A sets their script (stored in shared 'text' variable)
docA.addJS('console.log("Secret A");');

// 2. User B sets their script (overwrites shared 'text' variable)
docB.addJS('console.log("Secret B");');

// 3. User A saves their PDF (reads current 'text' variable)
docA.save("userA.pdf");

// Result: userA.pdf contains "Secret B" instead of "Secret A"

Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in jspdf@4.0.1. The fix moves the shared variable into the function scope, ensuring isolation between instances.

Workarounds

Avoid using the addJS method in concurrent server-side environments. If usage is required, ensure requests are processed sequentially (e.g., using a queue) rather than in parallel.

CVE-2026-24043

Impact

User control of the first argument of the addMetadata function allows users to inject arbitrary XML.

If given the possibility to pass unsanitized input to the addMetadata method, a user can inject arbitrary XMP metadata into the generated PDF. If the generated PDF is signed, stored or otherwise processed after, the integrity of the PDF can no longer be guaranteed.

Example attack vector:

import { jsPDF } from "jspdf"

const doc = new jsPDF()

// Input a string that closes the current XML tag and opens a new one.
// We are injecting a fake "dc:creator" (Author) to spoof the document source.
const maliciousInput = '</jspdf:metadata></rdf:Description>' +
    '<rdf:Description xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">' +
    '<dc:creator>TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR</dc:creator>' + // <--- Spoofed Identity
    '</rdf:Description>' +
    '<rdf:Description><jspdf:metadata>'

// The application innocently adds the user's input to the metadata
doc.addMetadata(maliciousInput, "http://valid.namespace")

doc.save("test.pdf")

Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF@4.1.0

Workarounds

Sanitize user input before passing it to the addMetadata method: escape XML entities. For example:

let input = "..."

input = input
    .replace(/&/g, "&")
    .replace(/</g, "&lt;")
    .replace(/>/g, "&gt;")
    .replace(/"/g, "&quot;")
    .replace(/'/g, "&apos;")

doc.addMetadata(input)

CVE-2026-24133

Impact

User control of the first argument of the addImage method results in Denial of Service.

If given the possibility to pass unsanitized image data or URLs to the addImage method, a user can provide a harmful BMP file that results in out of memory errors and denial of service. Harmful BMP files have large width and/or height entries in their headers, wich lead to excessive memory allocation.

Other affected methods are: html.

Example attack vector:

import { jsPDF } from "jspdf" 

// malicious BMP image data with large width/height headers
const payload = ...

const doc = new jsPDF();

doc.addImage(payload, "BMP", 0, 0, 100, 100);

Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF 4.1.0. Upgrade to jspdf@>=4.1.0.

Workarounds

Sanitize image data or URLs before passing it to the addImage method or one of the other affected methods.

CVE-2026-24737

Impact

User control of properties and methods of the Acroform module allows users to inject arbitrary PDF objects, such as JavaScript actions.

If given the possibility to pass unsanitized input to one of the following methods or properties, a user can inject arbitrary PDF objects, such as JavaScript actions, which are executed when the victim opens the document. The vulnerable API members are:

• AcroformChoiceField.addOption
• AcroformChoiceField.setOptions
• AcroFormCheckBox.appearanceState
• AcroFormRadioButton.appearanceState

Example attack vector:

import { jsPDF } from "jspdf"
const doc = new jsPDF();

var choiceField = new doc.AcroFormChoiceField();
choiceField.T = "VulnerableField";
choiceField.x = 20;
choiceField.y = 20;
choiceField.width = 100;
choiceField.height = 20;

// PAYLOAD:
// 1. Starts with "/" to bypass escaping.
// 2. "dummy]" closes the array.
// 3. "/AA" injects an Additional Action (Focus event).
// 4. "/JS" executes arbitrary JavaScript.
const payload = "/dummy] /AA << /Fo << /S /JavaScript /JS (app.alert('XSS')) >> >> /Garbage [";

choiceField.addOption(payload);
doc.addField(choiceField);

doc.save("test.pdf");

Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF@4.1.0.

Workarounds

Sanitize user input before passing it to the vulnerable API members.

Credits

Research and fix: Ahmet Artuç

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Release Notes

parallax/jsPDF (jspdf)

v4.1.0

Compare Source

This release fixes several security issues.

What's Changed

• Upgrade optional dompurify dependency to 3.3.1 in #​3948
• Fix PDF Injection in AcroForm module allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution vulnerability
• Fix Stored XMP Metadata Injection (Spoofing & Integrity Violation) vulnerability
• Fix Shared State Race Condition in addJS Method vulnerability
• Fix Denial of Service (DoS) via Unvalidated BMP Dimensions in BMPDecoder vulnerability

Full Changelog: parallax/jsPDF@v4.0.0...v4.1.0

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